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Abstract: The paper analyses the perceptions of the stakeholders regarding the key issues in Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) in the 
Nepalese Environment.  A total of 90 questionnaires representing sponsors, utility, lenders and government officials were used for the study. 
The questionnaire sought the perception of the stakeholders regarding the significance (importance) of the clauses and the likelihood of 
inclusion of the clauses in PPAs. Comparison of the ranks of means was conducted by Kruskal-Wallis tests to see the significance of the 
differences in responses of the stakeholders and Mann-Whitney tests to see the significance of the differences of the pairs of stakeholders. 
Data analysis showed clauses where the prime stakeholders have similar stands and clauses where the perceptions are divergent.  The 
findings of this paper will help the stakeholders in negotiating PPAs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past decade in Nepal, Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs), with local and foreign investment, have 
contributed more than 25% of the total generation 
capacity playing a major role in installing new hydropower 
facilities in the country. This has been facilitated by the 
introduction of Electricity Act 1992 and the Hydropower  
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Policy in 1992, by which a comprehensive legal framework 
for the development of hydropower was put in place for 
private participation in hydropower projects in Nepal. In 
contract-led projects like IPPs, offtake contracts are 
entered between the user organizations or individuals 
purchasing the offtake or using the facility itself and the 
promoter, Project Sponsors (Merna and Smith, 1994). In IPP 
projects, the offtake contract, termed Power Purchase 
Agreements (PPAs), can be defined as a contract for a 
large customer to buy electricity in bulk from a power 
plant. 
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 Crow (2001) has considered PPAs as the most 
important contract underlying the construction and 
operation of a power plant usually drawn at the 
implementation phase of IPP projects, as there can be no 
project if PPA is not reached. It is also extremely complex 
and politically sensitive issue, since it is the PPA that 
ultimately governs the price of electricity delivered to end-
users. The other project agreements including those 
covering engineering, procurement, construction, lending, 
operations and maintenance, can be negotiated only 
after the PPA is concluded. 
 
 As pointed out by Shrestha and Ogunlana (2006), in 
developing countries, the purchaser is, in almost all of the 
cases, the state owned enterprise often with monopoly on 
generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power 
while the project developers may be foreign investor, local 
investor, or a joint venture between local and foreign 
investors. The PPAs reached between the state-owned 
enterprise and the project sponsor is the contractual 
arrangement for sharing the risks and responsibilities 
between the contracting parties for a term, which may 
span up to 25–30 years depending on the contract. 
 Shrestha and Ogunlana (2006) also points out that 
Nepal, a developing country that lies between India and 
China, has an estimated hydropower generating potential 
of about 43,000 MW. However Nepal's current total 
installed generating capacity is only about 600 MW and its 
per capita electricity consumption of about 42 KWh is 
amongst the lowest in the world. Only about 40% of the 
population has access to electricity. In rural areas where 
the bulk of the population resides, access is even lower 
(5%), partly as a result of a higher priority given to providing 
power to high-density urban areas. Total energy 
requirement in Nepal is projected to grow by an average 
of 8% per annum over the forecast period of 2004 to 2020. 
Prior to 1992 hydropower development policy, private 
sector generation consisted of only a small amount of 
energy supplied by Butwal Power Company (BPC), the first 
IPP with limited capacity. The company was established in 
1978 with His Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMG/N) and 
United Mission to Nepal (UMN) shareholding primarily for 
Andhi Khola Hydroelectric and Rural Electrification Project 
(AHREP). Since then, considerable progress has been 
made in IPP with Khimti, Upper Bhotekoshi, Indrawati and a 
number of other IPPs coming into operation with a 
combined capacity of 140.6 MW, which is 26.25% of the 
total system. There are eleven projects in operation under 
IPP programme and three others at various stages of 
construction. PPAs have been concluded for fourteen 
more projects between private sponsors and the utility: 
Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), the only vertically 
integrated government subsidiary, charged with the 
responsibility of generation, transmission, and distribution of 
electric power in the country. NEA operates as a single 
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purchaser and single largest supplier and distributor of 
electricity in the country (NEA, 2005). The old hydropower 
policy of 1992 was replaced by Hydropower Development 
Policy 2001 to provide further impetus to the active 
participation of the private sector (Shrestha and Ogunlana, 
2006). 
 
 As pointed out by Head Chris (2000), all private 
infrastructure development carries common risks such as 
political, currency exposure, force majeure, etc. but 
hydropower is perceived as being exposed to additional 
risks in project definition, risks in hydrology, environment, 
financing, and regulatory risks. In Nepal, investment in 
hydropower has not been forthcoming. Disputes in PPAs 
have deterred private investments in electricity sector in 
Nepal. Even straightforward issues like scheduled outages 
and contract energy have led to disputes in PPAs in the 
Nepalese environment. Therefore, in the process of 
designing PPAs, a variety of questions need to be asked 
about the best feasible means satisfying the concerned 
parties allowing them to come to a zone of possible 
agreement. 
 
 When negotiating PPAs, the two prime stakeholders 
must first determine what they must have and what they 
are willing to give (bargaining chips), gather facts about 
the other party, learn about the other party's negotiating 
style and anticipate other side's position and prioritize 
issues. To ensure smooth negotiation, one should also 
prepare alternatives proposals and establish the Best 
Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). Estimate 
the other party's needs, bargaining chips and BATNA. The 
objective of this paper is to help identify the positions of the 
relevant stakeholders so that they can strive to reach 
agreement or courses of action to take where there is 
some degree of difference in interest, goals, values or 
beliefs.  
 
 
PRINCIPAL ISSUES IN PPAs 
 
Various authors have extensively studied major risk issues 
involved in infrastructure and hydropower development.  
Woody and Pourian (1992) have identified risks associated 
with project financing categorized into five groups. They 
are the start-up-cost risk, operating risk, technology risk, 
market risk, and political risk. 
 
 Ernst and Pham (1995) identified a number of risks 
with regard to BOT project financing: 
 
•  Construction risks 
•  Performance/technology risks 
•  Force majeure risks   
•  Economic risks 
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 Gupta and Sravat (1998) have identified the 
following issues in development and project financing of 
private power projects in developing countries: 
 
•  Country political risk 
•  Development and construction 
•  Operation and maintenance risk 
•  Foreign exchange risk 
•  Non-payment by sole power purchasers 
•  Regulatory risks 
 
 After considering risks studied in BOT projects and the 
issues and clauses that figure in most existing PPAs and the 
contentious issues faced by the stakeholders, the following 
were identified as being particularly suitable for the 
objective of this study in the Nepalese environment: 
 
1. Power Purchase Guarantees (PPGs) 
2. Force Majeure Guarantees (FMGs) 
3. Financial and Foreign Exchange Guarantees (FFGs) 
4. Operation risks 
5. Dispute resolution and insurance issues 
 
 The perceptions of the stakeholders in these issues will 
be the basis of identifying the shared interests and the 
positions of the negotiating partners and other 
stakeholders. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The questionnaire was developed based on the five main 
identified issues in PPAs mentioned above. The clauses that 
were tested for each category are as follows: 
 
1. PPGs 
 
•  Take or pay clause 
•  Energy before RCOD  
•  Min. energy supply 
•  Excess energy 
•  Demand charge (capacity) 
•  Third party sales 
 
2. FMGs 
 
•  Political risks 
•  Natural disasters 
•  Changes in laws  
•  Buyout clauses 
 
3. FFGs 
 
•  Convertibility 
•  Repatriation 
•  Escalation 
•  Tax holidays 
•  Conc. Funding 
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4. Operation risks 
 
•  Dispatch rights clauses 
•  Scheduled outages 
•  Availability declaration 
•  Maintenance clauses 
 
5. Other risk mitigating measures 
 
•  Informal dispute boards 
•  Arbitration 
•  Insurance before RCOD 
•  Insurance after RCOD 
 
 Each clause of the specified category was 
considered independently from the other types. The 
questions were asked with a two-pronged approach: 
asking the respondents to rate each factor according to its 
significance (importance) and the likelihood of inclusion of 
each factor in PPAs of their involvement. The perceptions 
of the stakeholders deduced from the responses regarding 
the clauses are as follows:  
 
• Clauses rated very significant and very likely to be 
included in PPAs are inferred as important clauses 
with positive impact for the stakeholder. 
• Clauses rated significant and highly unlikely to be 
included in PPAs are inferred as clauses with negative 
impact for them.  
• Clauses rated insignificant but likely to be included 
are inferred as less important clause with positive 
impacts. 
• Clauses rated insignificant and unlikely to be 
included in PPAs are inferred as clauses less important 
with negative impacts for the stakeholders.  
• Intermediate ratings are inferred as per se. 
 
 A five-point Likert scale was used with point (3) as a 
neutral point to separate low level of significance,  
insignificant (2) and highly insignificant (1) ratings  from high 
level of significance significant (4) and very significant (5) 
ratings. Similarly, point (3) was used as a neutral point to 
separate low level of likelihood unlikely (2), and highly 
unlikely (1) (less than 3 points) from high level of likelihood,  
likely (4) and extremely likely (5) ratings in likelihood of 
inclusion of the factors in PPAs of involvement of the 
respondents.  
 
 The questionnaire also contained the respondent's 
organization, the profession, and years of involvement in 
the IPP industry. This allowed classifying the respondents 
according to the stake in the industry. 
 
 The target population being studied for this research 
was a combination of professionals involved in IPP projects 
such as sponsors, bankers, and utility and government 
officials to represent the stakeholders, knowledgeable in 
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the issues of PPAs. The sampling technique used for data 
collection was judgement sampling, conforming to 
criterion like the experience of the respondents in the field 
of IPP projects rather than a randomly chosen sample. To 
improve the representativeness, proportionate sampling 
quota for all the four stakeholders was assigned. The 
respondents from the IPPs were chosen to represent all the 
relevant class of industry. 
 
 The statistical population for the sampling frame was 
drawn from the following sources: 
 
1. Project sponsors 
 
•  IPPAN – IPPs Association of Nepal Directory 
•  NHA – Nepal Hydropower Association Directory 
 
2. Utility 
 
•  NEA – Nepal Electricity Authority Directory 
 
3. Lenders 
 
•  Banker's Consortium Directory 
 
4. Government 
 
•  Ministry of Water Resources 
•  Water and Energy Commission 
 
 The abovementioned organizations maintain a 
comprehensive directory of all the organizations and 
individuals related to IPPs. The respondents for the study 
were all individuals involved in IPP. Priority was given to 
decision makers among the stakeholders.  
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Details of the Respondents 
Ninety respondents from four prime and secondary 
stakeholders returned completed questionnaires. The 
respondents were decision makers in their respective fields 
and represented lenders, sponsors, utility and the 
government. There were 22 respondents representing 
lenders from four leading commercial bank involved in 
financing IPPs. Likewise, there were 28 respondents 
representing sponsors from seven IPPs. The 22 respondents 
from the utility are all involved in power trade and decision 
makers in their respective fields. The 18 respondents 
representing the government are from the Department of 
Water Resources, Department of Electricity Development 
and the Water and Energy Commission Secretariat. 
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Table 1. Percentages of different types of respondents 
Respondents No. Percentage 
Lenders 22 24.44 
Project sponsors 28 31.11 
Utility officials 22 24.44 
Government officials 18 20.00 
Total 90        100.00 
 
 The data analysis consisted of the following: 
 
1. Comparing the means of the responses for each set 
of guarantees regarding the significance and the 
likelihood of inclusion of the clauses in PPAs as 
presented in Tables 2–6. 
 
2. Kruskal-Wallis test – A non-parametric test with no 
assumptions about the shape of the underlying 
population distribution is carried out for each set of 
responses. The null hypothesis for this test is that the 
samples come from the same population or from the 
population with identical means and the alternative 
hypothesis is that not all the population comes from 
the same population. The critical values for rejecting 
the hypothesis are from the chi-squared table 
determined by comparing the calculated probability 
with the alpha level which has been set at 0.05. If the 
"Prob." value is less than or equal to 0.05, the result is 
significant. The results are presented along with the 
means of the respondents.  
 
3. Mann-Whitney test – These tests are carried out to see 
how the means of the chosen pairs of samples differ 
and to see the degree of separation. The null 
hypothesis assumes that the two sets of scores are 
samples from the same population and do not differ 
significantly. The alternative hypothesis, on the other 
hand, states that the two sets of scores differ 
significantly. The maximum separation is indicated by 
a U=0 and small values of U lead to rejection of Ho 
and large values of U lead to failure to reject the null 
hypothesis. The critical values for rejecting the 
hypothesis are determined by comparing the 
calculated probability with the alpha level which has 
been set at 0.05. If the "Prob." value is less than or 
equal to 0.05, the result is significant. The test are 
carried out for the following pairs of samples: 
 
•  Prime stakeholders: sponsors and utility 
•  Project sponsors and lenders 
•  Utility and government 
 
 The abovementioned stakeholders are pairs who 
deal with each other and consensus in their perceptions 
help in reaching the PPAs sooner.  
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 Means of the responses of the stakeholders shown 
in Table 2 show the importance of the category of PPGs: 
take or pay contract, supply guarantees of minimum 
energy and the purchase guarantees of excess energy, 
where all the stakeholders have rated it as being very 
important in PPAs.  As shown by Kruskal-Wallis test in Table 
2, the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference 
between the responses of the stakeholders regarding the 
importance of clauses: take or pay, energy before RCOD, 
demand charge and supply guarantees of minimum 
energy is being accepted at 5% level of significance. 
However, there is a significant difference in the responses 
at the same level of significance regarding the clauses: 
excess energy and third party sales with Kruskal-Wallis test 
indicating that some stakeholders regard these clauses as 
more significant than others. Mann-Whitney tests carried 
out for the pairs of prime stakeholders, who actually deal 
with each other: utility vs. sponsors, lenders vs. sponsors, 
and utility vs. government, show that the null hypothesis is 
rejected at 5% level of significance in the importance of 
the clause: supply of the minimum energy, but for the other 
clauses of the category, PPGs, the null hypothesis is 
accepted at the same level of significance. The null 
hypotheses are accepted for all the clauses regarding 
importance of PPGs at the same level of significance for 
the pair: lenders and sponsors. For the pair: utility and 
government, the null hypothesis on the importance of PPGs 
is rejected for the clause: excess energy.  
 
 Regarding the likelihood of inclusion of PPGs, Kruskal-
Wallis tests showed that the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference between the responses of the 
stakeholders is rejected at 5% level of significance for 
clauses: take or pay, supply of energy before RCOD, 
supply guarantees of minimum energy, supply of excess 
energy and accepted for clauses: demand charge and 
supply to third party sales. The clauses, take or pay, energy 
before RCOD, excess energy are favoured more by the 
lenders and sponsors while the supply guarantees of 
minimum energy is favoured by the utility and the 
government. Meanwhile, Mann-Whitney tests showed that 
the null hypothesis, that there is no significant difference in 
the responses of the pair of prime stakeholders: utility vs. 
sponsors, is being rejected at 5% level of significance for 
the clauses: take or pay, supply of energy before RCOD, 
supply guarantees of minimum energy, supply of excess 
energy and accepted for clauses: demand charge and 
third party sales. As mentioned above, the clauses: take or 
pay clause, supply of energy before RCOD, and supply of 
excess energy are being favoured by sponsors and the 
supply guarantees of minimum energy by the utility. There is 
no significant difference between the responses of the 
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 Table 2. Issues Concerning PPGs 
Significance of PPGs 
Means Kruskal-Wallis  
Lends. Spons. Util. Govt. KW Sig. P 
Take or pay clause 4.41 4.36 4.68 4.50 2.24 0.52 
Energy before RCOD 3.77 4.04 3.73 3.44 7.02 0.07 
Min. energy supply 4.36 4.25 4.68 4.50 5.66 0.13 
Excess energy 4.09 4.11 4.23 3.39 12.73 0.01 
Third party sales 3.77 4.04 3.86 3.11 11.80 0.01 
Likelihood of Inclusion in PPAs 
Means Kruskal-Wallis  
Lends. Spons. Util. Govt. KW Sig. P 
Take or pay clause 4.50 4.46 2.86 2.94 *41.65 0.00 
Energy before RCOD* 3.86 4.25 2.82 3.33 31.63 0.00 
Min. energy supply 4.23 4.18 4.77 4.56 13.12 0.00 
Excess energy 3.82 4.14 2.18 2.78 46.31 0.00 
Demand charge (capacity) 3.68 3.25 3.00 3.22 5.85 0.119 
Third party sales 3.95 3.82 3.36 3.89 4.95 0.18 
Significance of PPGs–Mann-Whitney 
Spons. Vs. Util. Lend. Vs. Spons Util. vs. Govt.  
U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P 
Take or pay clause 252.50 0.21 302.50 0.91 177.00 0.58 
Energy before RCOD* 281.00 0.57 246.00 0.18 147.00 0.17 
Min. energy supply  205.00 0.02 282.00 0.58 169.50 0.44 
Excess energy 261.50 0.33 302.00 0.90 90.50 0.00 
Demand charge (capacity) 264.00 0.363 255.00 0.263 150.50 0.199 
Third party sales 296.50 0.81 261.00 0.31 119.00 0.03 
Likelihood of Inclusion in PPAs–Mann-Whitney  
Spons. vs. Util. Lend. vs. Spons. Util. vs. Govt.  
U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P 
Take or pay clause 86.50 0.00 306.00 0.96 185.00 0.71 
Energy before RCOD 92.50 0.00 212.53 0.04 129.00 0.04 
Min. energy supply 170.00 0.00 307.00 0.98 155.00 0.15 
Excess energy 38.00 0.00 241.00 0.17 116.00 0.02 
Demand charge (capacity) 262.50 0.35 236.50 0.129 172.00 0.45 
Third party sales 232.00 0.12 273.00 0.46 141.00 0.10 
     Notes:  Bold figures denote responses significantly different at 5% level of significance 
        * Energy before Required Commercial Operation Date (Interim Energy) 
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pair: lenders and sponsors, regarding the likelihood of 
inclusion of the PGs. Lenders and sponsors both favour the 
clauses: take or pay clause, purchase of energy produced 
before RCOD, and purchase of excess energy and 
moderately favour demand charge and third party sales. 
For the pair: utility and government, the null hypothesis is 
rejected for the clauses energy before RCOD and supply 
of excess energy with the utility less in favour of the 
purchase of excess energy than the government albeit 
marginally. The government and the utility both favour the 
clause supply guarantees of minimum energy and they are 
not in favour of inclusion of take or pay clause, purchase of 
energy before RCOD and purchase guarantees of excess 
energy. 
 From the responses, it can be inferred that for the 
utility, take or pay, supply of minimum energy, and 
purchase guarantees of excess energy are severe clauses. 
For the sponsors along with the lenders, it can be inferred 
that clauses take or pay contract, supply of interim energy, 
and supply of excess energy have been favourable and 
they prefer including it in PPAs. The alternative the utility 
has in addition to take or pay clause in future negotiations 
are: take if offered clause or take and pay clause where 
the utility will not have to pay for the energy that it is not 
able to dispatch. 
 
 As shown by Kruskal-Wallis tests in Table 3, there is no 
significant difference in the responses of the stakeholders 
regarding the significance of majority of force majeure 
clauses. There is a significant difference in the responses of 
the stakeholders regarding political risks. The sponsors and 
the utility have rated the political risks and natural disaster 
risks clause as being more significant than the lenders and 
the government. Changes in law have been rated as 
being more significant by all the stakeholders.  Regarding 
the likelihood of inclusion in PPAs of force majeure clauses,  
there is a significant difference in the responses between 
the stakeholders as indicated by Kruskal-Wallis test in the 
clauses: political risks and natural disaster risk and there is 
no significant difference in the clauses: changes in law and 
buyout clauses. Political risk clauses are favoured more by 
 
 In general, the parties have rated the clauses 
significant and unlikely to be included in the PPAs as 
follows: 
 
• Utility: Take or pay, min. contract, excess energy 
• Government: Take or pay, excess energy 
 
Clauses rated significant and likely to be included in PPAs 
are: 
 
• Sponsors: Take or pay, interim energy, min. energy, 
excess energy, third party sales 
• Utility: Min. contract 
30/PENERBIT UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA 
 
 Table 3. Issues Concerning FMGs 
Significance of FMGs 
Means Kruskal-Wallis Clause 
Lends. Spons. Util. Govt. KW Sig. 
Political risks 3.95 4.39 4.23 2.89 29.78 0.00 
Natural disasters  4.09 4.54 4.18 4.33 2.758 0.43 
Changes in laws  3.91 3.82 4.05 4.17 1.943 0.584 
Buyout clauses 3.68 3.75 4.14 3.83 4.17 0.25 
Likelihood of inclusion in PPAs 
Political risks 3.91 4.50 3.86 3.17 27.393 0.00 
Natural disasters  4.18 4.75 4.41 4.50 9.524 0.02 
Changes in laws  3.91 3.79 3.55 3.78 1.329 0.722 
Buyout clauses 3.55 3.29 4.09 3.72 10.097 0.018 
Significance of FMGs –  Mann-Whitney  
 Spons. vs. util. Lends vs. spons Util. vs. govt. 
 U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P 
Political risks       268  0.39  218  0.059  42.00  0.00 
Natural disasters      260.50  0.30  233.50  0.108  193.00  0.90 
Changes in laws   274.50  0.488  306  0.967  182.50  0.677 
Buyout clauses  233.50  0.121  294.50  0.777  154.50  0.24 
Likelihood of inclusion of FMGs in PPA – Mann-Whitney 
Spons. vs. util. Lends vs. spons Util. vs. govt.  
U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P 
Political risks  169  0.003  189  0.012  99.50  0.006 
Naturald disasters   222  0.042  175.50  0.003  188.00  0.798 
Changes in laws   266  0.391  300.50  0.877  174.00  0.527 
Buyout clauses  161  0.002  258  0.295  150.50  0.199 
 
     Note * Bold figures denote responses significantly different at 5% level of significance 
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the sponsors and the lenders than the utility and the 
government. Natural disaster clauses are favoured by the 
sponsors and the government. Inclusion of changes in law 
clauses has been given moderate importance by the 
stakeholders. Mann-Whitney tests,  carried out between 
the pairs of prime stakeholders show that between the 
prime stakeholders: the sponsors and the utility, and the 
lenders and the sponsors, there are no differences 
regarding the significance in all of the clauses, while 
between the pair: utility and sponsors, there is a difference 
regarding the significance of the political risks clause.  
 
 However, there is a difference in responses between 
pairs of the prime stakeholders in the likelihood of inclusion 
of the force majeure clauses. Mann-Whitney tests show 
that there is a significant difference between the pair of 
stakeholders; sponsors vs. utility regarding the likelihood of 
inclusion of FMGs; political risks, natural disaster risks and 
buyout clauses, and no significant difference in the 
responses regarding the inclusion of the clause: changes in 
law. The sponsors are in favour of including political risk and 
natural disaster clause while the utility is in favour of 
including the natural disaster clause and buyout clause. 
Both prime stakeholders agree on the inclusion of changes 
in law clauses. For the pair: lenders and sponsors, Mann-
Whitney tests show that there is a significant difference in 
perception of inclusion of the political risks and risks 
regarding natural disaster and no significant difference in 
the clauses: changes in law and buyout clauses. The 
sponsors are more in favour of political risks and natural 
disaster risk than the lenders while the lenders are more in 
favour of changes in law and buyout clauses than the 
sponsors. Between the pair of stakeholders: government 
and utility, regarding the inclusion of force majeure risks, 
Mann-Whitney tests show that there is a significant 
difference in the political risks clause. The government is 
less in favour of including political risk clause in PPAs 
although its subsidiary, the utility, is in favour of the clause. 
 
In short, the parties have rated the following clauses as 
significant and likely to be included in PPAs: 
 
• Sponsors: Political risks, changes in laws, natural 
disaster risks 
• Utility: Natural disasters, buyout clauses 
• Lenders: Political risks, changes in laws, natural 
disaster risks 
• Government: Natural disasters 
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 Table 4. Issues Concerning FFGs 
Significance of FFGs 
 Means Kruskal-Wallis 
 Lends. Spons. Util. Govt. KW Sig. 
 
Convertibility 4.00 3.75 2.77 3.67 *20.94 0.00 
Repatriation 4.45 4.04 3.91 4.50 7.25 0.06 
Escalation 4.59 4.36 4.32 4.44 1.31 0.73 
Tax holidays 3.68 4.36 3.86 4.00 8.32 0.04 
Conc.  funding 4.41 4.14 3.36 4.44 11.66 0.01 
Likelihood of Inclusion of PPAs 
 
Convertibility 4.32 3.46 3.14 3.44 21.48 0.00 
Repatriation 4.41 3.21 3.50 3.61 21.11 0.00 
Escalation 4.45 4.36 3.77 3.83 11.51 0.009 
Tax holidays 3.59 4.36 3.59 3.00 24.97 0.00 
Conc.  funding 4.05 4.25 3.18 3.89 15.93 0.001 
Significance of FFGs–Mann-Whitney 
 Spons. vs. util. Lends. vs. spons. Util. vs. govt. 
 U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P 
 
Convertibility 132 0.00 263.50 0.347   85 0.002 
Repatriation 304 0.934 214 0.043 138 0.106 
Escalation 286 0.633 255.50 0.247 194 0.925 
Tax holidays 267 0.385 177.50 0.007 170 0.459 
Conc.  funding 200 0.027 268 0.395   99 0.006 
Likelihood of Inclusion of FFGs  in PPAs 
 Spons. vs. util. Lends. vs. spons. Util. vs. govt. 
 U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P 
 
Convertibility 238.50 0.15 159.50 0.002 147.50 0.17 
Repatriation 264 0.37 100 0.00 184.50 0.72 
Escalation 205 0.03 283 0.58 198 1.00 
Tax holidays 172.50 0.00 156.50 0.00 117.50 0.03 
Conc.  funding 131 0.00 260.50 0.312 124 0.05 
                                          Note:  Bold figures denote responses significantly different at 5% level of significance 
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 There is disagreement in the perceptions of the 
stakeholders regarding the importance of three of the 
financial and foreign exchange category of risks. Kruskal-
Wallis tests show the null hypothesis, that there is no 
significant difference in the perceptions of the stakeholders 
regarding importance of the clauses, is rejected at 5% 
significance level for clauses: convertibility, tax holidays, 
and concessional funding and accepted for escalation 
and repatriation clauses. Convertibility and concessional 
funding is rated significant by the lenders while tax holiday 
clause is rated significant by the sponsors. The repatriation 
and escalation clauses have been rated as significant by 
all the stakeholders. Mann-Whitney tests showed that for 
the prime stakeholders: utility and sponsors, the null 
hypothesis, that there is no significant difference between 
the responses of the two stakeholders is rejected at 5% 
significance level for convertibility clause while the 
perceptions on the significance of other clauses in financial 
and foreign exchange group of risks are accepted. 
Likewise, test shows that the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference between the perceptions of the pair: 
lenders and sponsors regarding the importance of financial 
and foreign exchange group of risks is rejected for clause: 
tax holidays, and for pair: utility and government is rejected 
at the same significance level for clauses: convertibility 
and concessional funding. 
 
 On the other hand, Kruskal-Wallis test shows the 
perceptions of likelihood of inclusion of the same group of 
clauses were all rejected at 5% level of significance. The 
responses of the stakeholders regarding the inclusion of 
FFGs differ significantly among the stakeholders. As shown 
in Table 4, Mann-Whitney tests show that the null hypothesis 
that there is no significant difference between the 
perceptions of the prime stakeholders: sponsors vs. the 
utility regarding the inclusion of the clauses in PPAs, is 
rejected at 5% significance level for the clauses: escalation 
and tax holidays. The clauses escalation, tax holidays and 
concessional funding are favoured by the sponsors while 
the utility has rated the clauses as being moderately likely 
to be included in PPAs. Likewise, for the pair: lenders and 
the sponsors, the null hypotheses that there is no significant 
difference in the responses of this pair of stakeholders were 
rejected for clauses: convertibility, repatriation and tax 
holidays. The lenders favour the inclusion of the clauses 
convertibility and repatriation while the sponsors are in 
favour of the inclusion of tax holiday clause. Mann-Whitney 
tests also show that for the pair of stakeholders:  utility and 
government, the null hypotheses that there is no significant 
difference in the responses of the respondents regarding 
inclusion of financial and foreign exchange clauses were 
accepted for all the clauses. 
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The clauses rated significant and unlikely to be included in 
PPAs are as follows: 
 
• Lenders: Devaluation 
• Government: Devaluation 
 
And clauses rated significant and likely to be included in 
PPAs are: 
 
• Sponsors: Escalation, tax holidays, concessional 
funding  
• Lenders: Escalation, repatriation, convertibility, 
concessional funding  
 
 The sponsors perceive the likelihood of inclusion of 
escalation, tax holidays, and concessional funding clauses 
and the lenders perceive escalation, repatriation, and 
convertibility as important issues and favour including it in 
PPAs. For the utility, escalation and devaluation are more 
important issues affecting PPAs and are not in favour of 
including them in PPAs. 
 
 In the category of operation risks, Kruskal-Wallis tests 
show that the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference in the perceptions of the stakeholders regarding 
the significance of the clauses is rejected at 5% 
significance level for all the listed clauses as shown in Table 
5. While the significance of operation guarantee clauses 
has been rated high by the utility, the lenders have rated it 
as only moderately significant. Mann-Whitney tests show 
that for the pair of prime stakeholders: utility and sponsors, 
the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in 
the perceptions regarding the significance of the 
operation risks is rejected at 5% significance level for 
clause: dispatch rights, with the utility rating it significantly 
higher than the sponsors; while the perceptions on the 
significance of other clauses in operations group of risks are 
accepted.  However, for the pair: lenders and sponsors, 
Mann-Whitney tests show that the null hypotheses are 
rejected for the clauses: scheduled outages, availability 
declaration, and maintenance clauses and for the pair: 
utility and government, it is rejected for the clause: 
dispatch rights at the same significance level. 
 
 Similarly, as shown in Table 5, Kruskal-Wallis tests show 
that the stakeholders have rejected the null hypotheses 
that there is no significant difference in the perceptions of 
the stakeholders regarding the likelihood of inclusion of the 
category of operation risk clauses at 5% level of 
significance. The clauses are favoured by the utility and the 
sponsors while the lenders show moderate likelihood of 
inclusion of operation clauses in PPAs. Mann-Whitney tests 
indicate that the prime stakeholders: utility and sponsors 
have significant differences in their responses in the 
inclusion of clauses: dispatch rights, scheduled outages, 
and maintenance. These clauses are favored more by
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 Table 5. Issues Concerning Operation Guarantees 
Significance of Operation Guarantees 
 Means Kruskal-Wallis 
 Lends. Spons. Util. Govt. KW Sig. 
 
Dispatch rights clauses 3.64 3.89 4.59 3.72 19.07 0.00 
Scheduled outages 3.32 4.29 4.59 4.11 30.01 0.00 
Availability declaration 3.68 4.39 4.73 4.33 27.09 0.00 
Maintenance clauses 3.41 4.43 4.73 4.67 33.26 0.00 
Likelihood of Inclusion of PPAs 
 
Dispatch rights clauses 3.77 4.18 4.80 3.40 32.69 0.00 
Scheduled outages 3.32 4.25 4.70 4 29.83 0.00 
Availability declaration 3.68 4.36 4.60 4 22.90 0.00 
Maintenance clauses 3.45 4.18 4.80 4.60 31.25 0.00 
Dispatch rights clauses 3.77 4.18 4.80 3.40 32.69 0.00 
Significance of Operation Guarantees – Mann-Whitney 
 Spons. vs. util. Lends. vs.spons. Util. vs. govt. 
 U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P 
 
Dispatch rights clauses 148 0.001 256.50 0.274  92 0.003 
Scheduled outages 238 0.121 115 0.00  116 0.026 
Availability declaration 213 0.032 136.50 0.00  136 0.095 
Maintenance clauses 224 0.057 111.50 0.00  186 0.757 
Likelihood of Inclusion in PPAs–Mann-Whitney  
 Spons. vs. util. Lends. vs. spons. Util. vs. govt. 
 U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P 
 
Dispatch rights clauses 167.50 0.00     213 0.042      33.50       0.00 
Scheduled outages 216 0.04 138.50 0.001 78 0.001 
Availability declaration 236 0.11     152 0.001 100 0.007 
Maintenance clauses 142 0.00 172.50 0.004 155 0.251 
 
                                       Note: Bold figures denote responses significantly different at 5% level of significance 
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the utility than the sponsors. For the pair: lenders and 
sponsors, the null hypotheses are rejected for all the 
clauses regarding the operation group of clauses and for 
the pair: utility and government, the null hypotheses are 
rejected for the clauses: dispatch rights, scheduled 
outages, and available guarantees and accepted for 
maintenance clauses at 5% significance level. Responses 
show that dispatch right, scheduled outages, availability 
declaration and maintenance clauses have been rated as 
significant by the utility and are very likely to be included in 
PPAs. The lenders have rated operation clause as being 
less significant than other stakeholders. The utility is in favour 
of including these clauses. 
 
 The clauses rated significant and likely to be included 
in PPAs are: 
 
• Sponsors: Scheduled outages, availability 
declaration, maintenance clauses 
• Utility: Dispatch rights, scheduled outages, availability 
declaration, maintenance clauses 
• Government: Scheduled outages, availability 
declaration, maintenance clauses 
 
 In issues regarding the importance of dispute 
resolution and insurance clauses, Kruskal-Wallis test in Table 
6 shows that the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference in the responses of the stakeholders is rejected 
at 5% level of significance for clause: informal dispute 
resolutions, while the clauses for arbitration, insurance 
before RCOD and insurance after RCOD are all accepted 
at the same level of significance. The clauses pertaining to 
dispute resolution and insurance are rated significant by 
the stakeholders. Further Mann-Whitney tests show that for 
the prime stakeholders: sponsors and the utility, there is a 
significant difference in the clause: informal dispute 
resolution while the null hypotheses are accepted for the 
other clauses. For the pair: lenders and the sponsors, there 
is no significant difference in the responses at 5% level of 
significance and for the pair: utility and government, there 
is a significant difference in the clause informal dispute 
resolution at same level of significance. 
 
 Similarly, in the issue of likelihood of inclusion of the 
dispute resolution and insurance clauses, Kruskal-Wallis tests 
show that there is significant difference in the responses of 
the stakeholders regarding the clauses informal dispute 
resolution, arbitration, and insurance before RCOD. While 
the clauses are favour by the utility and the sponsors, it is 
rated as moderately likely to be included by the 
government. Mann-Whitney tests show that for the pair 
lenders vs. sponsors, there is a significant difference in the 
responses regarding insurance clauses. The lenders clearly 
favour the insurance clauses more than the sponsors. 
Similarly between the pair of the utility and the government 
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Table 6. Other Risk Mitigating Guarantees 
Significance of Other Risk Mitigating Guarantees 
 Means Kruskal-Wallis 
 Lends. Spons. Util. Govt. KW Sig. 
Informal dispute boards 3.77 3.89 4.41 3.56      17.10 0.001 
Arbitration 4.27 4.29 4.73 4.11 7.146 0.067 
Insurance before RCOD*   4.32 3.89 4.14 4.22 4.484 0.214 
Insurance after RCOD** 4.45 4.18 4.23 4.50 3.142       0.37 
Likelihood of Inclusion of PPAs 
Informal dispute boards 3.82 4.00 4.60 3.70 18.45 0.00 
Arbitration 4.27 4.36 4.90 3.90 23.05 0.00 
Insurance before RCOD*  4.41 3.93 4.00 3.90 8.318 0.04 
Insurance after RCOD** 4.50 4.11 4.40 4.30 4.967 0.174 
Significance of Other Risk Mitigating Guarantees – Mann-Whitney 
 Spons. vs. util. Lends. vs. spons. Util. vs. govt. 
 U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P 
Informal dispute boards      185 0.007 277.50 0.517  65.00       0.00 
Arbitration       212 0.033 302.00 0.899 116.00 0.026 
Insurance before RCOD*   257.50 0.289 213.00 0.036 191.50 0.861 
Insurance after RCOD** 295.50 0.792 245.50 0.179 162.00 0.338 
Likelihood of Other Risk Mitigating Guarantees Inclusion in PPAs 
 Spons. vs. util. Lends. vs. spons. Util. vs. govt. 
 U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P U-test Sig. P 
Informal dispute boards 165      0.00 272.00       0.45 58.50     0.00 
Arbitration 171 0.002 303.00 0.914 43.00       0.00 
Insurance before RCOD*   308       1.00 198.00 0.018 189.00 0.819 
Insurance after RCOD** 234.5       0.10 213.00 0.041 181.50 0.657 
 
Notes:  Bold figures denote responses significantly different at 5% level of significance 
 *   Insurance during construction phase 
ase  ** Insurance during operation ph
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there are significant differences in the responses regarding 
informal dispute resolution and arbitration clauses with the 
utility favouring the clauses more than the government. 
 
 The informal dispute resolution clauses have been 
rated important by the utility while the arbitration clause 
has been rated as important by all the stakeholders. The 
stakeholders favour the inclusion of the dispute resolution 
clauses and insurance clauses. 
 
 The clauses rated significant and likely to be included 
in PPAs are: 
 
• Sponsors: Arbitration, insurance after RCOD 
• Utility: Arbitration, informal dispute resolution, 
insurance after RCOD, insurance before RCOD 
• Lenders: Arbitration, insurance before RCOD and 
insurance after RCOD 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In negotiating PPAs, the parties are expected to strive for 
inclusion of clauses which they rate as highly significant 
and as highly likely to be included in PPAs, and to exclude 
the clauses they rate as highly significant and highly 
unlikely to be included in PPAs. The clauses that will be 
most difficult to negotiate will be the ones in which the 
differences between the negotiating parties as shown by 
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney test are the biggest.  
 
 From the results of the survey as shown in Table 7, it 
can be seen that take or pay clause, and sales of excess 
revenue are clauses in PPGs rated very significant with 
divergent views of the prime stakeholders and will thus be 
difficult to negotiate in PPAs while supply of minimum 
contract energy is a clause with similar views of the prime 
stakeholders and will be relatively easier to negotiate.  
 
 Likewise, in FMGs, political rights and buyout clauses 
are significant clauses with divergent views of the prime 
stakeholders and natural disaster clause is a clause with 
similar views.  
 
 In the issues of FFGs, escalation clause, tax holidays 
and concessional funding are significant clauses with 
divergent views of the prime stakeholders.  
 
 In operational guarantees, dispatch rights, scheduled 
outages, availability declaration and maintenance clauses 
all are significant clauses with similar views of the prime 
stakeholders.  
 
 In dispute resolution methods and insurance issues, 
informal dispute resolution and insurance before RCOD are 
stakeholders. 
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Table 7. Clauses Rated Significant and in Favour of Inclusion in PPAs 
 Sponsors Utility Comments 
Take or pay  Divergent views 
Sales of excess energy  Divergent views 
 
PPG Supply of min. contract Supply of min. contract Similar views 
Political risks  Divergent views 
Natural disaster risks Natural disaster risks Similar views 
 
FMG 
 Buyout clauses Divergent views 
Escalation   Divergent views 
Tax holidays  Divergent views 
 
FFG 
Conc. funding  Divergent views 
Dispatch rights Dispatch rights Similar views 
Scheduled outages Scheduled outages Similar views 
Availability declaration Availability declaration Similar views 
 
 
Oper. G 
Maintenance clauses Maintenance clauses Similar views 
 Informal dispute resolution Divergent views 
Arbitration Arbitration Similar views 
 Insurance before RCOD Divergent views 
 
Other risk 
mitigating 
measures 
Insurance after RCOD Insurance after RCOD Similar views 
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significant clauses with divergent views of the prime 
stakeholders. 
 
 The parties can use the results of the survey to 
evaluate the positions of the other party and to present 
suitable alternatives to the negotiated agreement. The 
parties can also make trades in clauses to create a win-win 
situation. For example, in FMGs, the sponsor's are in favour 
of inclusion of the political risks clause while the utility is in 
favour of inclusion of buyout clauses. The parties can make 
trades to include both the clauses creating a win win 
situation. Similarly, clauses where the parties have equal 
interests can be used to create a favourable environment 
of negotiations. 
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